



A Logarithmic Lower Bound for Oblivious RAM (for all parameters)

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


האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM






Access pattern
Leaks data



Frequency,
Correlation





ORAM, Correctness



[Goldreich-Ostrovsky '87,96]

“Online”:
Answer a query
before next

ORAM operations (array):

* Update(i , )

* Query(i)





(implementation)

“Probe” memory “cells”



[Yao '81]






ORAM, Security



[Goldreich-Ostrovsky '87,96]

**Any sequence of
Update / Query**

ORAM (array):




Computationally indistinguishable
Read / Write sequence


(stronger alternative: identical distribution)





Probed
locations




ORAM, Parameters




64-bit program:
Array of n entries, each b bits




Network packets:
Each cell w bits




ORAM, Efficiency




b -bit operation




I/O Efficiency:
Num. probes per operation



w -bit probe






b -bit

ORAM
size n

w -bit



I/O Efficiency

$\log n$

1

0

"OptORAMa" [Asharov et al.'20]



$w \uparrow \Rightarrow$
I/O efficiency \downarrow

Main question:
Can we do better **when $w > b$** ?
Eg: $O(1)$ I/O efficiency
if $w \geq b \cdot \log n$?

[Goldreich-Ostrovsky'87,96]

Lower bound: $\frac{b}{w} \cdot \log n$


[Larsen-Nielsen'18]

1 ($w = b$)

\sqrt{n}

n


w/b



b -bit

ORAM
size n

w -bit



I/O Efficiency

$\log n$

1

0

This result: stronger lower bound

$$\Omega\left(\log n / \log \frac{w}{b}\right)$$

$\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}$



$$w \geq b \cdot \log n$$


Lower bound: $\frac{b}{w} \cdot \log n$

1 ($w = b$)

\sqrt{n}

n

w/b



I/O Efficiency

$\log n$

1

0

1 ($w = b$)

\sqrt{n}

n

w/b

$w \leq b \cdot \text{poly} \log n$


$w \geq b \cdot n^{0.01}$

$\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}$

Lower bound: $\frac{b}{w} \cdot \log n$

Lower bound $\Omega\left(\log n / \log \frac{w}{b}\right)$

Lower Bound Proof




1. Update

2. Query



b -bit




ORAM
size n




w -bit



Previous work: "Hard" sequence [Larsen-Nielsen'18]





Previous work: "Hard" sequence




Key Idea: Random Queries

1. Update random values
 $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, \dots, x_n$




2. Query entries
1, 2, 3, 4, ..., n



Intersection
 $\geq n \cdot \frac{b}{w}$ cells




$\geq \frac{b}{w}$
I/O per query




If $w \gg 100 b$, then I/O $\ll 0.01$?
Too good to be true!


Key Idea: Random Queries




Main Technical Lemma



Main Technical Lemma





Main Technical Lemma



b -bit


ORAM
size n

w -bit




Proved by compression argument

Boost by Security



Boost by Security, Recursively







b -bit



ORAM
size n

w -bit



$$\Omega(nb/w)$$

$$\Omega(nb/w)$$

$$\Omega(nb/w)$$





$$\Omega(nb/w)$$


$$\Omega(n)$$

Degree w/b

Boost by Security, **Recursively**


Tree height = $\log_{w/b} n$
 $\Rightarrow \#I/O = \Omega(n \cdot \log_{w/b} n)$
per n Query/Update





1. Update random values

$x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, \dots, x_n$



2. Query random entries

$r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4, \dots, r_{nb/w}$

b -bit




ORAM
size n

Main lemma (this hard sequence):


With high prob: intersection = $\Omega\left(n \cdot \frac{b}{w}\right)$ cells

w -bit



Main result (any ORAM):

Any $b \geq w$, I/O = $\Omega\left(\log n / \log \frac{b}{w}\right)$



- Unconditional (not “balls-and-bins” model)
- Computational (ORAM may use any crypto)

Challenge to main lemma

1. Update random values

$x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, \dots, x_n$

2. Query random entries

$r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4, \dots, r_{nb/w}$

With high prob:

intersection = $\Omega\left(n \cdot \frac{b}{w}\right)$ cells

Suppose not, then exists ORAM:

Intersection $\leq 0.01 n \cdot \frac{b}{w}$

\Rightarrow Can compress random values

$x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, \dots, x_n$

To $< 0.99 nb$ bits (**impossible**)



Alice (impossible compress)

[Pătraşcu, Demaine'06]

1. If Intersection of $(x_1, \dots, x_n ; r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{nb/w})$ is large, then output (x_1, \dots, x_n) directly;
Else, continue.
2. **Write** small Intersection (of cell contents, $0.01nb$ bits)
3. Pick random t from 1 to nb/w .
4. For each i from 1 to n :
If Query($r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{t-1}, i$)
can NOT be answered by small Intersection,
then **Write** x_i


Analysis, simplified

- X, Y independent random variables
- Y^* random variable, independent and identically distributed to Y
- $f(x, y)$ arbitrary Boolean function

Then:

$$\Pr[f(X, Y^*) = 1 \mid f(X, Y) = 1] \geq \Pr[f(X, Y) = 1]$$

A “win” makes it more likely to “win”





b -bit



ORAM
size n

w -bit



Main result (any ORAM):

$$\text{Any } w \geq b, \quad I/O = \Omega\left(\log n / \log \frac{w}{b}\right)$$

(extends to multi-server setting)

Open problems:

- Remaining gap (for computational security)
- Lower/upper bound for
 - Weaker notions (eg, differential-private ORAMs)
 - Stronger notions (eg, statistical security)

Related **new results**:

- ORAM with Worst-Case Logarithmic Overhead (Crypto2021)
- Optimal Oblivious *Parallel* RAM

Thank you!